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A small open economy produces a consumer good, green and black energy, and imports fossil 
fuel at an uncertain price. Unregulated competitive markets are shown to be inefficient. The 
implied market failures are due to the agents’ attitudes toward risk, to risk shifting and the 
uniform price for both types of energy. Under the plausible assumptions that consumers are 
prudent and at least as risk averse as the producers of black energy, the risk can be efficiently 
managed by taxing emissions and green energy. The need to tax (!) green energy contradicts 
the widespread view that subsidization of green energy is an appropriate means to enhance 
energy security in countries depending on risky fossil fuel imports. 
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Many countries, notably the Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol, take action to curb
carbon dioxide emissions, and many OECD countries also have policies to promote energy
from renewable energy sources (OECD/IEA 2008). From the economists’ perspective, such
regulation is warranted, if it serves to correct for signiﬁcant market imperfections. While
the case is strong for using carbon cutting policies to cope with global change externalities,
the economic rationale for supporting the (domestic) production of green energy is less
clear. The theoretical economic literature on green energy support focuses on learning-by-
doing and technological spillovers (e.g. Fischer and Newell 2008, Fischer 2008) as well as on
externalities combined with various other imperfections such as imperfect property rights
or information (e.g. Bennear and Stavins 2007). Yet there appears to be little agreement on
whether such market imperfections are empirically relevant enough to provide a convincing
rationale for promoting green energy.
Nonetheless, the political support for promoting green energy is still strong in many
countries, if not growing. The reasons policymakers put forward for that support tend to dif-
fer from the economists’ arguments alluded to above. For example, in the recently amended
German Renewable Energies Act, the purpose of that act is described as the sustainable
development of energy provision especially in the interest of using fossil resources care-
fully and reducing the dependence from energy imports.1 The European Commission (Com
2007) acknowledges serious energy challenges concerning security of supply and import de-
pendence and argues that the promotion of renewable energies plays a part in securing
energy supply. The EU Renewable Energies Roadmap aims at enabling the EU to meet
the ’twin objectives’ of increasing security of energy supply and reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
As for the objective of ﬁghting global change, green energy promotion as well as emis-
sions reduction schemes clearly curb emissions and thus both of them contribute to climate
stabilization. However, there is ample evidence and theoretical support for the proposition
that promoting green energy is less cost-eﬀective as a means of ﬁghting climate change than
the reduction of carbon emissions through instruments targeting those emissions directly
(Fischer and Newell 2008). Consequently, if ﬁghting global change is considered the only
political goal, there is no role for green energy promotion.2 In the present paper we will
1Federal Government of Germany/Bundesregierung (2008), Gesetz zur Förderung erneuerbarer Energien
im Wärmebereich, Bundesgesetzblatt Jg. 2008 Teil I Nr. 36 vom 18.8.2008.
2In a report to the German Federal Ministry of Aﬀairs in 2004 the scientiﬁc council to that ministry
recommended discontinuing the promotion of green energy in Germany on the grounds that the introduction
of the European emissions trading scheme has turned the promotion of green energy into an ecologically
1consider, as many policymakers do, energy security as a political goal in its own right (in
countries that heavily depend on the import of fossil energy resources). It is then clear that
this goal is also promoted by both types of instruments, i.e. by green energy promotion as
well as by emissions reduction schemes. Yet the decisive questions are whether the degree
of energy security is ineﬃciently low in the absence of regulation and if so which instru-
ment is more eﬀective in correcting for that ineﬃciency. If supporting green energy should
turn out to be necessary for eﬃcient risk management, one would have found a theoretical
foundation for the observed green energy promotion with a rationale diﬀerent from ﬁghting
global change and from other reasons mentioned above.
The present paper aims at exploring the role and eﬀectiveness of curbing emissions and
promoting green energy as alternative or joint instruments for the eﬃcient management of
risk from energy insecurity in countries that depend on fossil fuel imports. To our knowledge
that issue has not yet been addressed in the analytical literature which is remarkable given
the prominence policymakers assign to the energy security goal and their conﬁdence that
green energy needs to be supported for promoting that goal. A key feature of our analytical
approach will be uncertainty with respect to the price of imported fossil fuels. Among the
various reasons for such uncertainties are political instability in fuel-exporting countries,
market power or cartels of these countries and perhaps sharp price ﬂuctuations due to
large-scale speculation.3
To tackle fossil fuel price uncertainty we consider a small open economy which imports
fossil fuel at an uncertain price to produce black energy. In addition to black energy
the economy produces green energy. We neither include in our model carbon emission
externalities nor R&D and R&D externalities in green energy production. The ﬁrst part
of the paper characterizes allocative eﬃciency depending on the representative consumer’s
attitude toward risk and studies how the eﬃcient allocation changes when the price risk
increases. Following Feder, Just and Schmitz (1977) we assume that the social planner
makes all decisions on production, consumption and trade before the uncertainty about the
fossil fuel price is resolved. The social planner accounts for the consumer’s risk attitude. In
contrast, in the competitive market economy it is the producer of black energy who faces
input price uncertainty.4 Again, decisions (now producers’ and consumers’) on production,
useless and economically expensive instrument.
3Outstanding empirical examples of such price uncertainty (and volatility) are the massive supply-side
induced oil price shocks in the 1970s. Quantity uncertainty, i.e. the risk of delivery falling short of ordered
fossil fuel imports (which currently appears to exist, e.g., with respect to Russian natural gas exports) is
another aspect of energy insecurity. However, with fully ﬂexible prices quantity uncertainty necessarily
translates into price uncertainty. The present paper focuses on ﬂexible prices.
4Our treatment of the competitive ﬁrm under price uncertainty goes back to Sandmo (1971) and Batra
and Ullah (1974).
2consumption and trade are made before the true value of the international fossil fuel price
is known (see also Batra and Russel 1974). In doing so, we implicitly assume there does not
exist a future market for the input and hence there is no hedging opportunity for producers.
When economic agents, or the social planner, make decisions under uncertainty, the
resultant allocations depend on the agents’ attitudes toward risk. We focus on risk aver-
sion and risk neutrality in alternative scenarios and show that it crucially depends on the
assumptions regarding the agents’ risk attitutes whether taxes or subsidies on imported
fossil fuels and/or on domestic green production are eﬀective means of risk management.
In general, regulation of black and green energy is shown to be necessary for eﬃcient risk
management. If we take the scenario, where producers are less risk averse than consumers
and consumers are prudent as the most relevant one, the striking message of the present
paper is that eﬃcient risk management requires
(i) curbing fossil fuel imports (and thus curbing carbon emissions) and
(ii) taxing (!) rather than subsidizing green energy production.
Taxing carbon emissions appears to be reasonable as a means to cope with price
uncertainty of fossil fuel imports because that tax reduces fuel imports directly and with it
the size of risk. The emissions tax also stimulates the production of green energy, but the
promotion of green energy would, of course, be more eﬀective by subsidizing green energy.
The tax on green energy required for eﬃcient management counteracts the impact of the
emissions tax on both emissions and green energy. It turns out, however, that the emissions
tax is dominant in the sense that as compared with the no-policy scenario the net eﬀect
of both taxes is an emissions reduction. On the other hand, green energy production may
either decline or it may increase despite the green-energy tax.
For a better understanding of the nature of the market failures (to be corrected with
two ﬁscal instruments) we also brieﬂy consider the case where black energy is not produced
domestically from imported fossil fuel, but where, instead, consumers purchase black energy
directly on the world market at an uncertain price. We ﬁnd that now the competitive
economy is eﬃcient without any tax or subsidy for two reasons. First, no risk shifting takes
place and second, the market provides the correct diﬀerentiation between the prices for
green and black energy. In our model with black energy production, the price of both types
of energy is uniform because they are homogeneous products and are considered perfect
substitutes by the consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. In Section 3 we derive
the properties of the eﬃcient allocation and present the comparative statics of the price
risk on the eﬃcient allocation. Sections 4 and 5 investigate various corrective tax-subsidy
3schemes in an economy where the producer of black energy faces the price uncertainty.
Section 6 turns to a modiﬁed economy where the consumers are directly exposed to the
price risk. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider the economy of a small open country that generates energy z according to
b = B(e), g = G(rg) and z = b + g. (1)
Fossil fuel, e, is used as an input in the production of ’black’ energy b. ’Green’ energy, g, is
produced by means of the domestic (composite) production factor rg. Both kinds of energy,
b and g, are perfect substitutes. In addition to energy the country produces the amount
x = X(rx) (2)
of some (composite) consumption good X with input rx. The production functions B,G
and X are increasing and strictly concave. All fossil fuel needs to be imported at the
uncertain world market price pe +q. The price pe is constant, whereas q is a risky mark-up
representing a random variable with support [0,∞[, with mean µq ≥ 0 and with standard
deviation σq ≥ 0. The country pays for its imports with revenues from exporting good X
that is traded at the constant world market price px ≡ 1. The trade balance reads
x − xd − (pe + q)e = 0, (3)
where xd denotes the domestic consumption of good X. Since the trade balance contains
the random variable q, the consumption of good X,xd, turns out to be a random variable
with the moments
µx = x − (pe + µq)e and σx = σqe. (4)
Supply and demand match for both capital and energy,
rg + rx = ¯ r and z = zd, (5)
where ¯ r denotes the country’s endowment of the production factor and zd is the domestic
consumption of energy. The model is closed by introducing the representative consumer’s
utility function
u = ˜ U(xd,zd) = V(xd) + U(zd), (6)
4where the subutility functions V and U are increasing in their argument and concave. In (6)
the consumer derives utility from consuming good X and energy. We can think of energy
consumed by households in various alternative forms, e.g. electricity or natural gas and/or
oil for heating or gazoline/diesel for automobiles. The function b = B(e) is interpreted
as technology transforming imported fossil energy sources, like crude oil, into secondary
energy, like electricity or gazoline.
Since the set of distributions of the random variable xd implied by (4) forms a linear
class, expected utility and mean-variance preferences are perfect substitutes (Meyer 1987).
It follows that any given von Neumann-Morgenstern function V can be represented in terms
of mean-variance preferences without loss of generality. Therefore, we write the expected




V(µx + σxn)dF(n) =: V (µx,σx), (7)
where a and b deﬁne the interval containing the support of the standardized random variable
n, and F is the distribution function of n. Due to that standardization, the mean and the
standard deviation of n are, respectively, zero and one. Denoting by A(xd) := −
Vxx(xd)
Vx(xd) the
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion and by M(µx,σx) := −
Vσ(µx,σx)
Vµ(µx,σx) the marginal
rate of substitution between µx and σx, Meyer (1987) and Lajeri and Nielsen (2000) have
shown that the identity (7) gives rise to the following equivalences between von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions and two-parameter functions5:
Vx(xd) > 0 ⇐⇒ Vµ(µx,σx) > 0, (8a)
Vxx(xd) < 0 ⇐⇒ Vσ(µx,σx) < 0, (8b)
⇐⇒ Vµµ < 0,Vσσ < 0,VµµVσσ − V
2
µσ > 0, (8c)
Vxxx(xd)   0 ⇐⇒ Vµσ   0, (8d)
Ax(xd)   0 ⇐⇒ Mµ   0 (8e)
for all µx and σx ≥ 0. (8b) reﬂects risk aversion which also corresponds to the concavity
of V (µx,σx), see (8c). Following Kimball (1990) we call an agent6 prudent [imprudent] if
and only if her preferences display Vxxx > [<]0. In view of (8d) and as identiﬁed by Lajeri
and Nielsen (2000) prudence translates into Vµσ > 0 for mean-variance preferences. Finally,
an agent is said to be decreasing [increasing] absolute risk averse if her mean-variance
preferences exhibit Mµ < [>]0. Decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and prudence
5For notational convenience we suppress the arguments of the function V (µx,σx) when there is no risk
of confusion.
6An agent is prudent if adding a zero-mean risk to her future wealth raises the optimal savings in an
intertemporal consumption problem (Kimball 1990).












In case of risk neutrality, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is linear, and
it is straightforward to show
Vxx = 0 ⇐⇒ Vσ = Vµσ = Vµµ = Vσσ ≡ 0. (10)
3 The eﬃcient allocation
Consider a benevolent planner who maximizes the representative consumer’s expected util-
ity
E˜ U(xd,zd) ≡ V (µx,σx) + U(zd)
subject to (1), (2), (4), (5). Solving the associated Lagrangian
L = V (µx,σx) + U(zd) + λr(¯ r − rg − rx) + λz [B(e) + G(rg) − zd]
+ λµ [X(rx) − (pe + µq)e − µx] + λσ(σqe − σx) (11)



















d ) = pz
Production 3 Xr(r∗
x) = ϕr Xr(rm
x ) = pr
Energy 4 ϕzGr(r∗
g) = ϕr (pz − s)Gr(rm
g ) = pr
Production 5 ϕzBe(e∗) + ϕσσq = pe + µq pzBe(em) +
Wσ(µπ,σπ)
Wµ(µπ,σπ)σq = pe + µq + t
Table 1: Eﬃciency and markets with producer price uncertainty
(Notation: ϕz = λz/λµ, ϕr = λr/λµ and ϕσ = λσ/λµ)




























6The ﬁrst term in (12) is the marginal rate of transformation between x and g. Since
x∗
s = X(r∗
x) = X(¯ r−r∗
g) = X[¯ r−G−1(g∗)], the value of X∗
r/G∗
r uniquely determines x∗ and















the optimality condition in the absence of risk (σq = 0). Xn
r /Gn
r clearly determines xn
and gn which gives rise to the question whether g∗ is greater or smaller than gn. Simple
calculations show that
g
















(pe + µq)V ∗
µ
(< 0). (13)
Hence there is ˜ e > en such that g∗   gn ⇐⇒ e∗   ˜ e. To interpret that result consider mean
preserving spreads of the random variable q. As long as in the transition from σq = 0 to
σq > 0 the reduction in the use of fossil fuel is not too strong (i.e. as long as e∗ > ˜ e > en)
it is optimal to produce more green energy under uncertainty than under certainty. Yet we
cannot infer from (13) whether e is decreasing and g is increasing in risk. These mappings
may as well be non-monotone because general equilibrium eﬀects need to be accounted
for and the sign and size of second derivatives of the utility function V may play a role.
To further clarify the impact of risk on the optimal allocation we carry out a full-scale
comparative-static analysis (Appendix A) and report the results in
Proposition 1. If the eﬃcient allocation of the model (1), (2), (4)-(6) is disturbed by
a small variation in the risk parameter σq, the direction of change in the eﬃcient values
























− + − ?
Table 2: Impact of variations in risk on the eﬃcient allocation
(Notation: ε := − Be
eBee > 0)
Note ﬁrst that all results reported in Table 2 refer to the case of risk aversion and prudence
(Vµσ > 0). Our focus on prudence is warranted because empirical evidence (Charas and Holt
1996, Guiso et al. 1996) and experimental evidence (Binswanger 1981, Levy 1994) suggest
that utility functions are decreasing absolute risk averse (Mµ < 0) which in turn implies
7prudence (Vµσ > 0).7 Unfortunately, in Proposition 1 the only clear-cut and intuition-
conforming information about an eﬃcient response to increasing risk is that fuel imports
need to be reduced. As the change in the provision of green energy can assume either sign
we get no answer to our central question whether expanding green energy is an eﬃcient
response to increasing risk.8 Under additional suﬃcient conditions listed in the second row
of Table 2 we attain the clear result dg/dσq > 0. These conditions do not seem to be
very restrictive. In view of (9) the ﬁrst inequality −
Vµσ
Vµµ > −Vσ
Vµ turns out to be DARA
which is not a controversial assumption in the pertaining literature. The second inequality,
−Vσ






, is satisﬁed if the price elasticity of demand for black energy is suﬃciently
large, i.e. if the production function B(e) has little curvature. A large value of ε can be
considered an approximation to linear cost functions (with setup costs) of power plants, an
assumption that is not uncommon in the energy economics literature. The observation that
dg/dσq > 0 for suﬃciently large ε nicely reconﬁrms the last inequality in (13). We know
from (13) that the diﬀerence Be(en) − Be(e∗) tends to zero for ε → ∞ and hence renders
positive the diﬀerence g∗ − gn.









where a > 0 and θ ∈]0,1[. The utility function (14) belongs to the class of hyperbolic
absolute risk averse functions and displays constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Since
utility functions of type (14) are mathematically convenient representations and simplify
comparative static analyses considerably, they are the most commonly used functional forms
in the expected utility approach (for applications see Cass and Stiglitz 1970, Hens et al.
2002 or Gollier and Schlesinger 2003). Wagener (2005) shows that the utility function (14)
translates into the mean-variance utility function





with H(0) = 1, and Hσ > 0 for all σ > 0. It is worth mentioning that prudence is not
only necessary for DARA functions but also for CARA functions (16). Hence the result
de/dσq < 0 from Table 2 is valid for CARA functions. In addition, Appendix B proves:
7There is also a strong theoretical argument for prudence. Menegatti (2001) has proven that Vx > 0,
Vxx < 0 and signVxxx being the same for all xd ≥ 0 is suﬃcient for Vxxx > 0 for all xd ≥ 0.
8It is interesting to note that even if dg/dσq < 0 in case of Vµσ ≥ 0, the ratio of green to black energy,
g/b, will increase if and only if |dg/dσq| < |db/dσq|. Changing the composition of total energy in favor of
green energy can then be considered as an expansion of green energy in relative rather than in absolute
terms.
8Proposition 2. Suppose the mean-variance utility function V (µ,σ) is specieﬁed by (16)
and the production function B(e) is speciﬁed by (15). If the eﬃcient allocation of the model
(1), (2), (4)-(6) is disturbed by a small increase in the risk parameter σq, then the eﬃcient
response is
(i) to reduce black energy production b,
(ii) to increase green energy production g,
(iii) to reduce total energy consumption z and
(iv) to reduce consumer good consumption x.
Under the conditions of Proposition 2 that are slightly more restrictive than those of Propo-
sition 1 an eﬃcient response to increasing energy insecurity consists in curbing black as well
as total energy while expanding green energy. That involves a shift in the composition of
total energy toward green energy which we have already identiﬁed in Proposition 1 under
the conditions of the second row of Table 2. The observation that the use of fossil fuel
is monotone decreasing in risk under conditions of both Propositions 1 and Proposition 2
suggests that this result appears to be quite robust.
Having characterized the social planner’s eﬃcient solution as a benchmark we will now
turn to the decentralized economy with perfectly competitive markets for the consumption
good, the resource and for energy. The government has at its disposal two instruments
whose rates are not sign-constrained to regulate fossil-fuel use and/or green-energy produc-
tion. In the remainder of the paper we seek to answer the following questions:
(i) Does the allocation of the no-tax competitive equilibrium deviate from the social
planner’s solution?
(ii) If it deviates, is it possible to characterize corrective tax-subsidy policies?
4 The competitive economy and corrective taxation
To prepare for tackling these core questions we ﬁrst need to specify the competitive econ-
omy with fossil fuel price uncertainty and taxation. Then we present the main result of
decentralizing the eﬃcient allocation by prices and taxes. We denote the market prices
associated with the perfectly competitive markets for the consumption good, the resource
and for energy by px ≡ 1,pr and pz, respectively. The government has at its disposal tax
policies (s,t) where s is the rate of a tax on green energy production and t is the rate of a
9tax on fossil fuel input;9 both rates are unconstrained in sign.10
In this setup, the proﬁts of the three industries are given by
πg = (pz − s)G(rg) − prrg, (17a)
πx = X(rx) − prrx, (17b)
πb = pzB(e) − (pe + q + t)e. (17c)
Inspection of the proﬁts πg,πx and πb reveals that it is the producer of black energy who
is exposed to and has to cope with price uncertainty while the other producers and the
consumer are not subject to any uncertainty.11 Hence the proﬁt of the producer of black
energy becomes a random variable such that she needs to determine her production plan
under input price uncertainty. However, her (ex ante) supply of black energy is deterministic
which means that the uncertainty is not passed on to the consumer. As will be shown
below, that diﬀerence in risk management of the social planner and the agents in the market
economy will lead to market failure which will then give rise to the question whether suitable
taxes and/or subsidies are available to correct for those failures.
The manager of the black energy ﬁrm is assumed to be either risk neutral or risk
averse. Her preferences are represented by the two-moment utility function W(µπ,σπ),
with the function W posessing the same properties as the function V in (8a)-(8e) and (10).
The manager’s decision problem is
max
e W(µπ,σπ) s.t. µπ = pzB(e) − (pe + µq + t)e,
σπ = σqe. (18)
For any tax policy (s,t), a competitive ex ante equilibrium of the economy (1) - (3) and (5)
is attained if the prices pr and pz are market clearing, if ﬁrms maximize proﬁts (17a), (17b),
9In our simple model, this tax is equal to an import tariﬀ as well as a carbon emissions tax.
10In practical policy, combinations of various ﬁscal instruments can be and are applied to promote green
energy and/or to curb carbon emissions (e.g. taxes on total energy consumption, taxes on black energy
consumption). To keep focused we refrain from characterizing all possible combinations of ﬁscal instruments
capable of supporting allocative eﬃciency. In our stylized model, the incidence of the green energy subsidy
(s < 0) is essntially the same as that of feed-in tariﬀs or green certiﬁcates. Similarly, the emissions tax
(t > 0) is here equivalent to an emissions trading scheme with t denoting the (endogenous) price of emission
allowances. Hence s and t stand for the prime instruments used in practice for promoting green energy and
for reducing emissions, respectively.
11Note the decisive diﬀerence between the risk management of the social planner and of the agents in
the market economy. The former does not account for (domestic) markets and proﬁts and thus rightly
identiﬁes the consumption of good X as a random variable derived from the price uncertainty in the trade
balance (see Section 3).
10(18), and if the representative consumer maximizes her utility (6) subject to the budget
constraint12
φ + pr¯ r = pzzd + xd, (19)
where φ := µm
π +πm
g +πm




x denote maximum proﬁts. The ﬁrst-order conditions listed in the




d ) for some predetermined tax policy (s,t), where the superscript m indicates the market
equilibrium. We now wish to determine that particular tax policy (s,t) which makes the
corresponding equilibrium allocation coincide with the social planner’s optimum. To that
end we compare the columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 and obtain
Proposition 3. A competitive ex ante equilibrium with producer price risk exists and
the pertinent equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient, if the (endogenous) prices are given by

















In (20) - (21), ϕr,ϕz,Be,Vµ and Vσ are evaluated at the solution of (11) and Vx,Wσ and
Wµ are evaluated at the agents’ optimal programs in the market economy.
5 The role of attitudes toward risk for corrective taxa-
tion
This section serves to discuss and interpret the results of Proposition 3 focusing on the
capacity of green subsidies and black taxes as means to cope with energy insecurity under
varying assumptions on attitudes toward risk.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬃcient tax/subsidy on green energy. In (21) it depends on the sign
of the diﬀerence Vµ(µx,σx)−Vx(xd) whether it is optimal to tax or to subsidize green energy.
It is therefore useful to begin with investigating the determinants of that sign. Recall that
(7) links the mean-variance utility function V (µx,σx) and the von Neumann-Morgenstern




Vx(µx + σxn)dF(n). (22)
12Observe that (19) is implied by (1) - (4) and recall that the consumer acts under certainty.
11An immediate implication of (22) is Vµ(µx,0) = Vx(µx), which gives rise to
Vµ(µx,σx)   Vx(µx) ⇐⇒ Vµσ(µx,σx)   0. (23)
for σx > 0. The right side of the equivalence (23) is linked, in turn, via (8d) to the concepts
of prudence and imprudence as deﬁned in our remarks on (8d) in Section 2. Hence we
have established that taxing green energy (s > 0) is eﬃcient, if and only if the consumer
is prudent (Vµσ > 0), and green energy needs to be subsidized [needs to remain untaxed
and unsubsidized], if and only if the consumer is imprudent [risk neutral]. These results
are independent of the black energy producer’s attitude toward risk.
We proceed making more transparent the implications of Proposition 3 by distinguish-
ing the consumer’s (and hence the benevolent planner’s) and the black energy producer’s
attitudes toward risk according to whether they are risk neutral (Vσ = 0,Wσ = 0) or risk
averse (Wσ < 0,Vσ < 0) and - in the latter case - whether the consumer’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function displays prudence (Vµσ > 0) or imprudence (Vµσ < 0). This
distinction of preference attributes gives rise to the following three scenarios:13
Scenario 1: The consumer is risk neutral (Vσ = 0) and the black energy producer is risk
averse (Wσ < 0) or risk neutral (Wσ = 0).
Scenario 2: The consumer is risk averse (Vσ < 0) and imprudent (Vµσ < 0) and the black
energy producer is risk averse (Wσ < 0) or risk neutral (Wσ = 0).
Scenario 3: The consumer is risk averse (Vσ < 0) and prudent14 (Vµσ > 0) and the black
energy producer is risk averse (Wσ < 0) or risk neutral (Wσ = 0).
Although these scenarios diﬀer with respect to their empirical relevance,15 we will
explore the implications of each of them to see what drives the results. The issue of
empirical relevance will be addressed later.
For Scenario 1, (21) readily yields the corrective policy




Note ﬁrst that any regulation of green energy, taxing as well as subsidizing, would render
the risk management ineﬃcient in Scenario 1. If Wσ < 0, the eﬃcient regulation consists
of subsidizing (!) fossil fuel. At ﬁrst glance that result may appear puzzling but its logic is
straightforward. If society, represented by the consumer, is risk neutral and the producer
is risk averse, the latter needs to receive an incentive in form of a subsidy to overcome her
13Observe that the sign of Wµσ is irrelevant for the qualitative results of Proposition 3.
14Recall that Vµσ > 0 is necessary for both CARA and DARA.
15Recall our remarks following Proposition 1 in Section 3.
12reluctance to take some risk in production. Curbing carbon emissions (t > 0) would reduce
rather than enhance welfare.
Suppose next that Vσ = Wσ = 0, i.e. that both the consumer and the black energy
producer are risk neutral. The straightforward implication is that (s = 0,t = 0) is the
optimal policy. No tax policy is needed at all to correct for allocative distortions because
there is no such distortion. Although risk exists, the agents essentially behave as under
certainty. Scenario 1 with Vσ = Wσ = 0 can therefore - and will later - be considered as
the benchmark case of certainty. We conclude that in Scenario 1 neither curbing emissions
via t nor promoting green energy via s can be rationalized as a means for enhancing energy
security.













as a corrective policy. In this case, promoting green energy (s < 0) is an appropriate means







= 0. According to (23) for imprudent consumers (Vµσ < 0) the marginal
utility of an additional unit of µx under uncertainty is lower than an additional unit of
xd(= µx) under certainty, in formal terms Vµ(µx,σx) < Vx(µx). With this information
we infer from (20) that the market price pz is lower than the associated shadow price
ϕz. Comparing column 1 and 2 in rows 4 and 5, respectively, of Table 1 and accounting
for pz < ϕz we conclude that the producers of green and black energy receive too weak
market price signals for producing energy, if s = t = 0. This market failure is corrected
by subsidizing green energy (s < 0) and subsidizing fossil fuel (t < 0). The green energy
subsidy stimulates the production of green energy, while the fossil fuel subsidy fosters the







 = 0. This term introduces an additional eﬀect caused
by the diﬀerence in the consumer’s and producer’s risk aversion. If the consumer is much
more risk averse than the producer, fossil fuel use has to be taxed, ceteris paribus, since the
producer is too lax in coping with risk. In contrast, if the consumer is less risk averse than
the producer, the producer is too anxious dealing with the risk and fossil fuel use has to be
subsidized. Therefore, the corrective tax rate can attain either sign irrespective of whether
Wσ < 0 or Wσ = 0. t > 0 is the more likely the greater is the consumer’s as compared










. In conclusion, in Scenario 2 green energy
promotion (s < 0) is an indispensible instrument for coping with energy insecurity in an
eﬃcient way. Under certain conditions, this holds for emissions reduction policies (t > 0)
as well but the case of welfare-enhancing fossil fuel subsidies cannot be ruled out.














The striking result is that eﬃciency requires discouraging (i.e. taxing) green energy produc-
tion rather than promoting (subsidizing) it. Using the same arguments as in Scenario 2 it
is now straightforward to show that pz > ϕz for prudent consumers. Hence, if Wσ
Wµ − Vσ
Vµ = 0
both green energy and the fossil fuel use needs to be taxed in order to manage the risk in
an eﬃcient way. Accounting for Wσ
Wµ − Vσ
Vµ  = 0, the eﬃcient fuel tax rate is unambiguously
positive, if the black energy producer is risk neutral. Otherwise it may be negative but
only if the producer’s risk aversion is suﬃciently stronger than that of the consumer (which
does not seem to be plausible).
We conclude that promoting green energy in Scenario 3 is not suitable as an instrument
to cope with energy insecurity. It is even welfare reducing and therefore harmful. Moreover,
except for cases of strongly risk averse black energy producers, taxing fuel is a necessary
instrument for eﬃcient risk management.
Instrument for eﬃcient risk management
fossil fuel policy (t) green energy policy (s)
Scenario 1 t ≤ 0 s = 0
Scenario 2 t < 0∗ s < 0
Scenario 3 t > 0∗ s > 0
∗under plausible conditions
Table 3: Assessment of instruments for risk management
Our preceding discussion of the Scenarios 1-3 and its summary in Table 3 show that
the eﬀectiveness of the tax instruments for an eﬃcient risk management crucially depends
on the agents’ attitudes toward risk. The appropriate choice of instruments is therefore
an empirical issue. Consumers use to be portrayed as being risk averse while producers
are usually considered as risk neutral. If producers are risk averse they are likely less risk








￿ ￿ ￿. Moreover, as we mentioned before,
empirical as well as experimental studies suggest that preferences exhibiting DARA are
realistic. Since DARA implies prudence, Scenario 3 appears to be more realistic than the
other scenarios. We highlight that main result of our policy analysis in16
16Suppose the government has at its disposal a sign-unconstrained tax on the sales price of both black
and green energy (but no emissions tax). If the consumer is prudent and more risk averse than the producer
14Proposition 4. Suppose consumers are prudent and at least as risk averse as producers.
Then eﬃcient risk management requires taxing both green energy and fossil fuels.
Recall that in the Introduction of the present paper we started out on the intuition or
conjecture that eﬃcient management of risk from energy insecurity might turn out to be
a rationale for subsidizing green energy. Subject to the qualiﬁcation that the behavioral
assumptions of Proposition 4 are empirically relevant we now ﬁnd the contrary. Not only
is green energy promotion ineﬀective as a means of coping with energy insecurity, it even
renders ineﬃcient the risk management.
The information on corrective regulation (s∗,t∗) we gained in Proposition 3 and the
subsequent discussion of the Scenarios 1-3 leave unanswered the question what the qual-
itative diﬀerence is between the no-policy allocation (eo,go) and the eﬃcient allocation
(e∗,g∗). It is tempting to argue that eo ⋚ e∗ if t∗   0 and go ⋚ g∗ if s∗   0. However, since
both tax instruments have an impact on both fossil fuel consumption and the production
of green energy, the ’backward inference’ from (s∗,t∗) to sign(eo − e∗) and sign(go − g∗) is
not that simple. To see this, take the puzzling observation that eﬃciency requires taxing
green energy in Proposition 4 while according to Proposition 2 and one part of Proposition
1 the eﬃcient production of green energy is strictly increasing in risk. For resolving that
seeming ’contradiction’ we ease the exposition by restricting our attention to the black en-
ergy producer being risk neutral. If in that case the consumer is risk neutral as well we get
the benchmark scenario (of risk neutral agents) which yields the same market allocation as
in the absence of risk. (See our discussion of Scenario 1 above). That, in turn, allows us
to draw on Pethig and Wittlich (2009) who analyze the model consisting of the equations
(1)-(3), (5) and (6) in the absence of uncertainty and characterize the equilibrium values
(e,g) for alternative policies (s ≤ 0,t ≥ 0). They illustrate their result in a graph which we
have reproduced here in Figure 1 and extended to include s ≥ 0 and t ≤ 0.
Point A in Figure 1 represents the levels of green energy, go, and fossil fuel eo, in
the no-policy competitive equilibrium (s = 0,t = 0). If we keep s constant at s = 0 but
successively increase t we move on the line AB from A toward B. During that move fuel
consumption declines and the production of green energy increases. Alternatively if we keep
t constant at t = 0 and successively increase |s|, where s ≤ 0, we move on the line AC from
A toward C, and we thus also curb the use of fuel and expand green energy. However, in
the latter case the increase in green energy is larger and the emissions reduction is smaller
than in the former case.17 Thus the area ABC in Figure 1 is the set of all equilibrium
of black energy both tax rates are positive and the rate on black energy is higher than the rate on green
energy.
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Figure 1: Allocations (e,g) of fossil fuel and green energy attained through policies (s,t)
allocations (em,gm) attainable through tax policies (s ≤ 0,t ≥ 0). Moreover, each point in
that area is uniquely associated with a tuple (s ≤ 0,t ≥ 0) that supports the corresponding
competitive equilibrium.
Figure 1 is a convenient device to illustrate how the eﬃcient allocation (e∗,g∗) deviates
from the no-policy market allocation (eo,go). Obviously, in Scenario 1 the eﬃcient allocation
coincides with the no-policy allocation in point A in Figure 1. If in Scenario 2 the corrective
policy is (s∗ < 0,t∗ < 0), the eﬃcient allocation is a point in the area above the line CAD,
e.g. point E. In this case we cannot exclude any divergence between (eo,go) and (e∗,g∗)
other than e∗ < eo and g∗ < go. If in Scenario 2 the corrective policy turns out to be
(s∗ < 0,t∗ > 0), the eﬃcient allocation lies in the interior of the triangle ABC at a point
such as F which implies e∗ < eo and g∗ > go. While the information on the divergence of
(eo,go) and (e∗,g∗) has been limited in the case (s∗ < 0,t∗ < 0) of Scenario 2 we now have
clear qualitative information on the kind of ineﬃciency of the unregulated economy. Thus
in the scenario under consideration the information of Figure 1 is more speciﬁc than that
from the ’marginal’ comparative statics of increasing the risk σq presented in Appendix A.
Finally, we turn to risk averse and prudent consumers (Scenario 3). With producers
being risk neutral, the corrective policy is characterized by (s∗ > 0,t∗ > 0) and the eﬃcient
allocation is a point below the line BAG. Inspection of Figure 1 shows that we cannot
exclude any divergence between (eo,go) and (e∗,g∗) other than e∗ > eo and g∗ > go.
However, we know from Proposition 1 that in the transition from eﬃciency under certainty
to eﬃciency under uncertainty the fossil fuel use decreases monotonely. Hence, the eﬃcient
16tuple (e∗,g∗) can only be a point in the interior of the area BAeo, e.g. the point H1 or H2.
As Proposition 1 shows the sign of go−g∗ remains unclear under risk aversion and prudence
(ﬁrst row of Table 2) so that we cannot discriminate between H1 and H2. However, with
some further qualiﬁcations (second row of Table 2 and Proposition 2) we know that (e∗,g∗)
is a point such as H1 in the interior of the triangle goBA. Observe that in this case the
inequality g∗ > go holds, while it is eﬃcient, at the same time, to tax green energy (s∗ > 0).
We have thus demonstrated that g∗ > go and s∗ > 0 is not an incompatible constellation.
For prudent consumers we summarize the results of the tax incidence in
Proposition 5. Suppose the preconditions of Proposition 4 hold and consider the tran-
sition from laissez-faire (s = 0, t = 0) to eﬃcient regulation (s∗,t∗).
(i) e∗ < eo and sign(go − g∗) unclear.
(ii) If the functions B and V are speciﬁed by (14) and (15), respectively, then e∗ < eo and
g∗ > go.
In concluding the discussion of Proposition 3 we observe that the ineﬃciency of the com-
petitive economy in the absence of ﬁscal policy (s = 0, t = 0) is caused by the fact that in
the market economy the black energy producer is the only agent who is exposed to the price
risk while the social planner (correctly) takes the consumer’s risk exposure into account.
Hence divergencies between Vµ (social planner) and Vx (consumer) are distortionary as well
as diﬀerences in risk aversion (Wσ/Wµ−Vσ/Vµ  = 0). The counter-intuitive result of a green
energy tax being optimal emerges only, because the risk averse and prudent consumer is
sheltered from the price risk by the black energy producer and therefore acts if there were
no risk.
6 Market eﬃciency in case of direct exposure to risk of
consumers
In this section we will highlight these reasons for allocative ineﬃciency by slightly modifying
our model (1)-(7). The modiﬁcation is a simpliﬁcation, in fact, and consists of replacing
b = B(e) by b ≡ e. The interpretation is that fossil fuel, e, is not transformed into black
energy by a domestic producer anymore. Instead, the consumer buys black energy directly
from the world market and hence is directly exposed to the risk of the fossil fuel price. The
production of green energy and of the consumption good still takes places in industries.
17The associated proﬁts are
πg = (pg − s)G(rg) − prrg, (24a)
πx = X(rx) − prrx, (24b)
where pg denotes the price of green energy. In contrast to the previous model, the repre-
sentative consumer now purchases black energy b ≡ e on the world market at the uncertain
price pe+q and she purchases green energy on the domestic market for green energy at the
deterministic price pg. The condition
G(rg) = gd (25)
clears the green energy market.
The consumer’s stochastic budget constraint is given by
φ + pr¯ r = pggd + (pe + q + τ)e + x, (26)
where τ denotes the tax rate on black energy consumption and φ := πc
g + πc
x + τb + sg
is a lumpsum transfer of proﬁts and net tax revenues to the consumer. The ﬁrst-order
conditions of the consumer’s decision problem
max
e,gd
V (µx,σx) + U(e + gd) s.t. µx = φ + pr¯ r − pggd − (pe + µq + τ)e,
σπ = σqe, (27)





































x) = ϕr Xr(rc
x) = pr
Energy Production 4 ϕzGr(r∗
g) = ϕr (pg − s)Gr(rc
g) = pr
Table 4: Eﬃciency and markets with consumer price uncertainty
(Notation: ϕz = λz/λµ and ϕr = λr/λµ)
For given tax policy (s,τ) the competitive ex ante equilibrium is constituted by prices





x). Comparing column 1 and 2
of Table 4 yields
18Column 1 of Table 4 is identical to column 1 of Table 1, if we set Be = 1 and eliminate ϕσ in Table 1.
18Proposition 6. A competitive ex ante equilibrium with consumer price risk exists and
the pertinent equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient, if the (endogenous) prices are given by
pr = ϕr and pg = ϕz. (28)
Proposition 6 shows that the laissez-faire competitive economy is eﬃcient if the consumers
face the price risk. It thus highlights that the policy conclusions of Proposition 3 are
essentially driven by the risk shifting from consumers to producers as discussed at the end
of Section 5. Observe also that the rows 1 and 2 in the second column of Table 4 yield
pe + µq > pg, if and only if the consumer is risk averse. It is then in the consumer’s self
interest to pay a higher price for green energy than for black energy. More generally, since
the eﬃcient equilibrium prices for green and black energy diﬀer (unless the consumer is
risk neutral), a uniform market price pz for both types of energy - as in the laissez-faire
competitive economy of the Sections 4 and 5 - fails to be eﬃcient. The tax/subsidy s
from (21) is needed to bring about the eﬃcient diﬀerentiation of prices for green and black
energy.19
To sum up, the modiﬁed model studied in the present section sheds additional light
on the reasons why the laissez-faire equilibrium of our previous model is ineﬃcient. There
are two market failures. First, an ineﬃciency arises because it is the black energy producer
instead of the consumer who is exposed to the risk. An emissions tax/subsidy is needed to
correct for diﬀerences in risk aversion of the consumer and the producer. Second, because
the black energy producer guards the consumer against risk the latter considers green
and black energy as perfect substitutes - which they are not. Therefore the resultant
uniform price, pz, fails to account for the price risk related to black energy. A green energy
tax/subsidy corrects for that market failure. Note that the rate s as deﬁned in the ﬁrst
equation in (21) also co-determines the size of the rate t. In that way, s brings about the
price diﬀerentiation for black and green energy to restore eﬃciency.
7 Concluding remarks
The present paper analyzes fossil fuel price uncertainty in a small open economy depending
on fossil fuel imports. Using mean-variance preferences which in our model are equivalent to
expected utility preferences we ﬁnd that increases in the variance of the fossil fuel price (=
increasing risk) reduce the eﬃcient black energy production in case of prudent consumers
19Interestingly, although black and green energy are physically homogeneous products the consumer
views them as imperfect substitutes in the present model speciﬁcation, because the price of green energy
is certain and that of black energy is uncertain.
19and enhance the eﬃcient green energy production for constant absolute risk averse con-
sumers. These results are intuitive. Turning to competitive markets we get at ﬁrst glance
counterintuitive results. If consumers are prudent and more risk averse than producers,
both fossil fuel and green energy have to be taxed to implement the eﬃcient allocation.
That risk shifting (from the consumer in the social planner’s program to the black
energy producer in the competitive economy) gives rise to two market failures, the correction
of which requires two ﬁscal instruments. If the consumer and the (black energy) producer
diﬀer with respect to their risk aversion, a tax/subsidy on fossil fuel is needed to compensate
for that diﬀerence. Moreover, since the producer guards the consumer against the price
risk, the latter considers black and green energy as perfect substitutes which therefore are
uniformly priced in the markets. This is ineﬃcient, however, unless the consumer is risk
neutral. The tax/subsidy on green energy serves to generate the wedge between the prices
for black and green energy which is a necessary condition for an eﬃcient allocation.
While our simple analytical framework allows for a clear focus and informative results,
the insights are limited due to restrictive assumptions. For example, learning spillovers
in the production of green energy would obviously raise the likelihood of green energy
subsidies being optimal. This is not true, however, if one would extend the model by
introducing a cost-eﬀective climate policy, say in form of a cap-and-trade scheme because
green energy promotion is less eﬀective in curbing emissions than an emissions tax. Yet
that extension would have other interesting implications. To see that suppose an emissions
cap is introduced that is more stringent than the emissions under eﬃcient risk management
without the emissions cap (Proposition 3). In that case the cost to society of the climate
policy is smaller than the total cost of the cap-and-trade scheme in the absence of risk
management because the optimal risk management also requires to curb emissions.
Our paper leaves open some various other issues. For example, it is unclear whether
our results also hold for import quantity uncertainty with rigid import prices. One might
also want to introduce forward markets and investigate hedging of the price risk. These
topics are beyond the scope of the present paper but appear to be interesting for future
research.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Comparative statics of the social planner’s solution with respect to σq: Maxi-
mizing V [X(¯ r − rg) − (pe + µq)e,eσq] + U [B(e) + G(rg)] yields the ﬁrst order conditions
−(pe + µq) − σqM +
Uz
Vµ




Gr = 0 ≡ Ω, (A2)
where M := −Vσ

























































































where D = ΦeΩrg − ΩeΦrg > 0 via the assumption that the second-order condition for





























Accounting for MσVµµ − MµVµσ = − 1
Vµ(VµµVσσ − V 2
µσ) in (A12) yields
de
dσq


























Next, we insert (A4), (A6), (A7), (A9) into (A11) and rearrange terms to get
drg
dσq



























Observe that MµVµσ − MσVµµ = 1
Vµ(VµµVσσ − V 2
µσ) and
Vσµ
Vµ (MMµ + Mσ) + MσMµ =
M
V 2
µ (VµµVσσ − V 2
µσ). Using this information in (A14) we get
drg
dσq



























Finally, using the ﬁrst-order condition (A1) in (A15) establishes
drg
dσq





























23According to (9) prudence (Vµσ > 0) implies decreasing absolute risk aversion (Mµ < 0).
In addition, the concavity of V (VµµVσσ − V 2
µσ) implies convex indiﬀerence curves, i.e.
Mσ + MMµ > 0. Then Vµσ > 0 and the concavity of V are suﬃcient for Mσ > 0. Using
these properties in (A13) we immediately get de/dσq < 0 if Vµσ > 0. Closer inspection of
























where ε := − Be
eBee > 0, and hence we get
drg

























The comparative static eﬀect dz/dσq is ambiguous in sign.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2




it holds Vµσ > 0 and using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 we get
de
dσq < 0 and db
dσq < 0. Next, observe that ε = 1
1−θ > 1 ensures that (A17) holds and we
obtain
drg
dσq > 0 and
dg











Be = θ − 1, Xr = Uz
VµGr and rearrange terms to get
dz
dσq


































Accounting for Mµ = 0 and Vµσ > 0 establishes dz
dσq < 0.
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